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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a ubiquitous system that
incorporates not only the current Internet of computers, but
also smart objects and sensors. IoT technologies often rely
on centralised architectures that follow the current business
models. This makes e cient data collection and processing
possible, which can be beneficial from a business perspective,
but has many ramifications for users privacy.
As communication within the IoT happens among many
devices from various contexts, they need to authenticate
each other to know that they talk to the intended party. Au-
thentication, typically including identification, is the proof
of identity information. However, transactions linked to the
same identifier are traceable, and ultimately make people
also traceable, hence their privacy is threatened.
We propose a framework to counter this problem. We
argue that applying attribute-based (AB) authentication in
the context of IoT empowers users to maintain control over
what data their devices disclose. At the same time AB au-
thentication provides the possibility of data minimisation
and unlinkability of user transactions. Therefore, this ap-
proach improves substantially user privacy in the IoT.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things is becoming a part of our daily
lives. Gartner predicts [24] that within five years there will
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be more than 25 billion devices that take part in the IoT.
Because the IoT delivers services in a fast and convenient
manner to users, it is viewed as a major business opportu-
nity [22].
Most IoT technologies rely on a centralised architecture,
in which sensors collect data from the world, communicate to
computers, which in turn send the data to a central service.
This architecture enables e cient operation and full control
over the data processing and dissemination, which makes it
an appealing approach for businesses. However, privacy con-
cerns arise since users cannot control the information that
is collected about them. Furthermore, organisations may be
subject to legal problems in terms of privacy regulation. In
our opinion and that of the authors of [22], in order for an
IoT architecture to be sustainable, it must be decentralised
and user-centric.
When devices communicate in the IoT, they often need
to authenticate to each other, so that they know that they
talk to the intended counterpart. Typically, authentication
involves identification by means of a unique number or name
and a token (e.g., a password or a cryptographic proof) that
proves the validity of the identifier. On the one hand, iden-
tifiers make authentication easy, provided that the verifier
has access to a database of these identifiers. On the other
hand, identifiers make all the transactions carried out by
a particular device linkable. Moreover, in many cases de-
vices are associated with an individual; so, indirectly people
become traceable as well. Based on the increasing amount
of user data, organisations, including advertisers, can build
profiles about people. This is obviously harmful to people’s
privacy, and in many countries, the use of data for tracing
and profiling is contrary to legislation governing the so-called
secondary use of data [26].
With regard to user control, data collection can be e↵ected
in two ways in the IoT [25]. First, there are devices which
the user can control how information is collected. Exam-
ples include wearables and smart home units. Second, there
are devices for which the user has no control over the data
collected; these include sensors and surveillance cameras in
public places for instance. This technical distinction has
to be taken into account when defining privacy and when
designing new IoT technologies.
IoT applications often rely on data analysis tools which
can recognise patterns and extract further useful informa-
tion from already collected data. For instance, analysing
energy usage of a neighbourhood can help distribute power
e ciently within a city. Such analysis tools are also suit-
able to discover personal information that users may want to
keep private. An important way to decrease the privacy risk
caused by data analysis is to reduce the amount of data col-
lected, as proposed by the European Parliament and Council
in their data minimisation principle [13].
Research in identity management [8, 23] shows that
attribute-based authentication can realise data minimisa-
tion with possible user control. Attributes, characteristics or
qualifications of entities, are embedded in a cryptographic
container which can be used for authentication purposes.
Since attributes such as the brand of a device or the na-
tionality of a person, can be anonymous, authentication can
also be anonymous. In fact, authentication should, and can,
be realised by using the minimum amount of information
required to successfully complete a transaction.
1.1 Our contribution
We recognise the importance of the right of the individ-
ual to have control of their own data and not to have their
transactions linked and tracked within the IoT. On the other
hand, the threat of mass surveillance and of linking users and
their devices to transactions is very real within the IoT.
In this research, we present a framework for providing the
user with the ability to avoid linkability and at the same
time, maintain control of their data. Our solution is based
on AB authentication instead of identification to guarantee
authenticity in the communication among devices in the IoT.
We demonstrate the feasibility of our framework by intro-
ducing it into a common use case, in a home environment.
We also argue that AB credentials should be considered
in every scheme where authentication is needed, as it will
provide the user with increased privacy and control with
respect to their personal information.
2. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we present some of the recent work re-
lated to authentication and privacy in IoT, and the uses of
attributes.
2.1 Authentication and Privacy in IoT
Position papers on IoT such as [30] and [14] often include
discussion on authentication and privacy. In fact, many
such papers point out the authentication and privacy prob-
lems arising from ubiquitous presence of sensors and devices,
and the subsequent analysis of massive amounts of collected
data.
As observed by the authors in [2, 3, 18, 35], one of the
capabilities of IoT is to allow sensors to collect information
from their surroundings, record and process it. With an on-
going surge in the number of inter-connected devices [24],
the tendency of collecting more information than required
for the provision of a service is on the rise.
Conversely, one of the business drivers of the IoT is ex-
pressed as “improved customer retention and more targeted
selling” [18]. This makes way for a strong tension between
the need for massive data collection, processing and commu-
nication required for the services of IoT on the one hand, and
privacy protection of individuals on the other [16,18]. More-
over, multiple studies have shown that collection of even
seemingly innocent data can lead, with very high probabil-
ity, to the identification of individuals [20,27,28].
2.2 Identifiers in IoT
While interacting with an IoT architecture, users perform
identity management [7] implicitly. They produce personal
information and leave traces mostly bound to their iden-
tity. For instance, adjusting your house’s temperature using
a mobile phone requires that the system knows that the in-
struction came from a legitimate party. Typically, a system
stores a lot of information about its users. The set of all this
data with respect to a particular individual is her identity in
this system. In most cases at least one of these pieces of in-
formation acts as an identifier, that is, a direct link between
the individual and the system.
The most common way to authenticate individuals and
devices and authorise them for services in today’s Internet
is by using Federated Identity Management [10]. These so-
lutions involve an Identity Provider and one or more Service
Providers. When a user needs to authenticate to a service,
the identity provider intervenes to assert the user’s identity
to the service provider. This allows for flexible authentica-
tion and the decorrelation of identities and services. How-
ever, the Identity Provider, being involved in all transac-
tions, can trace users connecting to services.
2.3 Use of Attributes
Authentication protocols often reveal more about the user
than necessary. Indeed, in many cases, only an assertion on
the user’s attributes is really needed. For instance the only
information that may matter is that the user belongs to
a registered service provider, or has a su cient clearance
level. In this sense, identity-based authentication does not
comply with the data minimisation principle as prescribed
by Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament. Ex-
isting identity-based authentications solutions however al-
ready admit that attributes are what really matters, since
after obtaining the user’s identity, the SAML standard [1]
(in particular) allows the service provider to request specific
attributes (or claims) about the user [10].
The ABC4Trust project [23] demonstrated that the
attribute-based credentials (ABC) technology is an adapt-
able means of realising both flexible and privacy-preserving
authentication. Indeed, the identity provider needs only to
be online when the credential is delivered to the user; this
prevents the identity provider from profiling users based on
their authentication patterns, and from impersonating them.
In addition, the user has control over which attributes are
used thanks to the selective disclosure mechanism of the
ABC constructions.
The main cryptographic schemes putting ABCs in prac-
tice are U-Prove [21] and Idemix [9]. They have been imple-
mented on smart cards [19,32] resulting in a U-Prove authen-
tication processed under 1 second, while that in Idemix is be-
tween 1 and 1.5 seconds. These technologies have also been
placed into light-weight infrastructures in [5,6,23]. However,
none of the previous research projects proposes to adopt
ABC technologies within the IoT.
3. NEW DIRECTIONS IN IOT PRIVACY
3.1 Privacy Threats
The usual approach in cryptography and security areas is
to define an adversary by his goals and capabilities. How-
ever, in data collection the initial goals may be set with the
best intentions of a data collector, but possession of the ac-
cumulated data can be transferred rightfully (or not) to a
data processor that does not share good intentions of the
original one. Hence, the adversarial goals are rendered ir-
relevant during data collection phase but can be of impact
during data processing and data dissemination phases.
Data over-collection [17] and the always-identify
paradigms described in the Introduction are other ex-
isting privacy threats that become increasingly harder in
IoT. Coupled with linkable transactions, that is transactions
the origins of which are known to be the same [15], these
threats enable extensive user profiling. For instance, service
providers can create a fingerprint of an individual based
on the types of devices he utilises, as presented by van
Deursen [31] in the case of RFID tags. This may give a
lot of information about the device owner; moreover, this
fingerprint acts as a new identifier, making it impossible for
the user to remain anonymous later.
3.2 Defining Privacy in IoT
We argue that the lack of control is one of the central
problems in IoT in terms of privacy. Individuals become a
part of a pervasive computing system, and by that, they gen-
erate a lot of personal information while having only limited
oversight and control over data collection and processing.
We adapt the definitions by Alan Westin [33] and Ziegel-
dorf et al. [35] as the former does not address the problem
of data collection and data processing, and the latter places
too much responsibility on the data subject.
Definition 1. Privacy is the right of individuals to de-
termine for themselves when, how and to what extent infor-
mation about them is collected, processed and communicated;
that includes individuals having
• the right to determine these aspects within their area
of control explicitly;
• trust that the right above is respected when control is
not possible.
Following taxonomy of privacy by Solove [26], privacy
threats are raised during data collection, data processing
and data dissemination activities and intrusions. Because
malicious intrusions form a whole body of work separate
from privacy, we do not discuss them here. Specific to IoT,
data collection is happening on a massive scale, much of
it is collected by sensors without any active initiation from
the user, thus often leaving users unaware of this process.
The large amount of data and the high number of potential
data sources increases severity of privacy threats at data pro-
cessing and dissemination activities compared to the today’s
situation in the Internet.
In the present, control over data processing and dissemina-
tion activities is largely in the hands of lawyers and policy
makers. From the users’ perspective, technologies provid-
ing them meaningful control are virtually non-existent. Al-
though some Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs) can
provide a solution to this problem, their use is left at the
discretion of companies and agencies, who only employ them
when regulation mandates so.
The control over data collection, on the contrary, is par-
tially in the hands of users. Indeed, although control is
impossible in the presence of sensors (such as surveillance
cameras) that collect user data in a passive manner, possi-
bility to control appears when the user or any of the devices
acting on his behalf (and that are under his control) are
actively engaged in a communication.
Altogether this makes privacy-friendly data collection an
important stepping stone towards achieving privacy in the
IoT. First of all, this is the only area in which it is feasi-
ble to implement some level of technological control from
the user’s perspective. Secondly, the increased amounts of
collected data leads to correspondingly increased levels of
threats during data processing and dissemination. Thus,
addressing this particular point – data collection – one can
provide significant increase in the privacy protection level of
an individual user.
4. REALISING IOT USING ATTRIBUTES
4.1 Attributes and Attributes-based Creden-
tials
Conceptually, attributes are properties or qualifications
of an entity. In practice, an attribute can be anything that
can be described as a bit-string, such as a name, a date of
birth or a cryptographic token. In this respect, attributes
generalise the notions of identifiers and roles.
An ABC [9,21] is a cryptographic container of attributes.
Similar to a traditional X.509 certificate, it is issued by a
trusted party, and is bound to a specific entity via this en-
tity’s secret key. That is, the issuer cryptographically signs
a token consisting in the concatenation of the attributes and
a commitment to the entity’s secret key. For instance, a ser-
vice provider may issue to each of its clients a subscription
ABC containing a client number, a specified purchase level
and the start date of the subscription. The issuer is trusted
for verifying that the attributes in an ABC authentically
belong to the entity. Having an ABC, an entity can show
its attributes and prove that they are signed by the issuer.
This is done using (non-interactive) zero-knowledge proofs
to guarantee that no other information (e.g. some leakage
about the secret key) is revealed.
In addition to the traditional unforgeability property,
ABCs come with many privacy-enhancing mechanisms [4,
Chapter 3]. First of all, because the proving of attributes
is performed in zero-knowledge, the verifier does not learn
the (commitment on) the secret key of the prover in the pro-
cess. Even better, some ABCs scheme have the multi-show
unlinkability property that prevents a verifier from linking
two showings of the same ABC by the same entity (except if
the content of attributes themselves leak information). Sec-
ondly, the selective disclosure functionality allows an entity
to demonstrate only an arbitrary subset of the attributes
contained in its ABC. Continuing the subscription ABC ex-
ample from above, a client can choose to show only its pur-
chase level, which may grant discounts and advantages, but
not its client number.
4.2 Privacy using Attribute-based Authenti-
cation
Privacy threats can be thwarted thanks to the privacy-
friendly properties of ABCs. First of all, the always identify
paradigm can be avoided by making all authorisation de-
cisions depend only on attributes, not identities. In most
cases, an assertion on the user is su cient. ABCs allow a
combination of assertions to be made, by simply showing
multiple attributes (e.g. the user paid a subscription, and
is an adult). It should be noted that in cases where the au-
thentication is absolutely necessary, e.g. when an individual
wants to communicate with one specific entity, ABCs can
also be used. The ABC must simply contain an attribute
representing the identity or public key of its holder. In sum-
mary, attributes achieve the same functionality as identifiers
with the same security level and also provide unlinkability.
By design, the selective disclosure functionality of ABCs
prevents data over-collection. Actually, an ABC can be
shown (or proved) without disclosing any of the attributes
it contains. Thus, the only leaked information is that the
holder of the ABC was accredited by the trusted issuer. This
information is su cient in a scenario where resources can
only be accessed by members of some institution, and that
institution is the issuer of ABCs.
The multi-show unlinkability property is designed to pre-
vent linkability of transactions. If an ABC is proved with-
out disclosing any attributen no linking at all is possible.
This is the best case scenario for the user. When showing
one or more attribute(s), a user leaks some information that
can be characterised in terms of k-anonymity [29]. For in-
stance, consider a 30 years old male user that proves his
gender and age to some service provider. From the service
provider’s point of view, who did not have any a priori in-
formation, the user could be any individual in the context’s
population before the showing of attributes: the anonymity
set is maximal. After learning the gender and age of the
user, the service provider can restrict the potential individ-
uals to 30 years old males in the population: the anonymity
set is much smaller. More generally, when a user shows a
set of attributes, it is k-anonymous among other users that
have (and show) the exact same attributes, and the service
provider can not distinguish between two transactions from
the same user or from two users in the anonymity set. In the
worst case, if the attribute is identifying the user uniquely
(k = 1), the service provider can link of all transactions.
To model possible information privacy harms, we use
Solove’s taxonomy [26, 35] as a starting point. Solove dis-
cusses four groups of harmful activities with regard to pri-
vacy, from which three (information collection, processing
and dissemination) are related to data flow while the fourth
one is not (invasions).
As a starting point, to identify data flows where AB au-
thentication is relevant, we again use Solove’s taxonomy of
privacy harms [26] (data collection, processing and dissem-
ination). This approach is similar the work of Ziegeldorf et
al. [35], but the authors do not address the authentication
aspects of the data flow. Therefore, we develop their model
further. Besides the three groups above, we consider addi-
tional activities in the IoT. First, the user is surrounded by
sensors, which can be divided in two groups. Some sensors
can be controlled by the users, while others not. Second, pro-
cessed data is partly used by the data subject within data
dissemination. Third, some part of the whole data flow is
a↵ected by credential providers that determine information
access of and related to the data subject.
In Figure 1 the data flow and possible attribute-based
authentication are represented. First, the data is sensed
around the data subject. Second, some of this information
is sent to the service provider. Then, the data processor, af-
ter processing (e.g., aggregate, search, analyse) the collected
information, disseminates it. Finally, the access to dissem-
Figure 1: Data flow and authentication in the Internet of
Things. (The red spots denote points of possible attribute-
based authentication.)
inated information may be restricted to a certain group of
entities (devices or people).
AB authentication can take place at four points in this
model – denoted by red spots:
1. Sensing. User-controlled sensors, such as wearables
and smart-home devices, can communicate with each
other locally. In this case, the authentication can be
based on attributes.
2. Collection. Sensors, when communicating with a ser-
vice (data processor) should authenticate to the ser-
vice. Possibly, the authentication can be mutual (i.e.
the service also authenticates to the device). In both
cases, it can also be based on attributes.
3. Dissemination. After collection and processing, data
processors should communicate restricted information
(e.g. individuals’ personal information) only after AB
authentication of the receiving party.
4. Issuing. Issuing itself is a part of the AB technology,
which provides a new credential to an entity. To make
sure that this entity is entitled to the particular cre-
dential, the credential provider has to authenticate the
entity. This can be done with conventional identifica-
tion, or by attribute-based authentication. The latter
is called in [8] a dependent credential.
5. USE CASE SCENARIO
5.1 Smart Home
Consider a scenario involving a home owner, hereby called
user, in possession of multiple smart devices and home ap-
pliances. The user’s devices, all under his control, are con-
nected to the Internet via a hub (installed within the home).
The devices autonomously connect to remote services in or-
der to push data to or pull data from them. Depending
on their business model, some of these services may require
users to get a subscription before consuming the service.
Therefore, a form of authentication is necessary for the ser-
vice to check if the devices belong to a valid user (i.e. one
that paid for a subscription). In a traditional IoT setup,
each user would have an account on the service’s platform,
where all his devices would be registered. A service would
accept requests only from devices that belong to a registered
user.
5.2 Privacy Threats
This framework carries several of the security and privacy
risks presented in Section 3, as described in [34]. The most
notable potential breach is the tracking of user among the
services ecosystem via his fingerprint (based on the set of
devices he owns). This fingerprint basically acts as an user
identifier of pseudonym and makes all his transactions link-
able, even if he does not disclose his identity. Moreover, if a
user conceals his identity to a particular service S but not to
another service S0, S can re-identify the user with the help
of S0, since both services have fingerprint for that user. To-
gether with data over-collection, common for current prac-
tices, allows for extensive user profiling. In the discussed use
case profiling is performed within such a sensitive sphere of
life as one’s behaviour at home.
5.3 Applying ABC
Using ABCs, one can avoid these issues. At the same time,
ABCs allow the user to have full access to the services he
paid for. With respect to Figure 1, ABCs are mainly relevant
in the issuing and collection phases, for the given use-case.
After an out-of-band authentication, the user and his devices
will first be issued a set of ABCs. These credentials permit
the devices to authenticate to services on behalf of the user.
Issuers can be various parties, including trusted third parties
and the service providers themselves. ABCs can include
attributes describing the model number of the device or the
subscription identifier of the user.
Then, the collection phase here consists of devices mak-
ing requests to the services. Before processing any such re-
quest, services require that devices authenticate by proving
possession of an AB credential. When authentication suc-
ceeds, the service is assured that the devices proving to have
AB credentials are genuine and belong to a valid user. At
the same time neither the user nor the device identity is
revealed. Information collected by the services during au-
thentication and transaction processing includes the nature
of the request itself, some meta-data such as the time and
issuer identity, and the attributes disclosed by devices. We
assume that the amount of information revealed by meta-
data (e.g. actual IP and MAC addresses) is reduced using
other privacy enhancing technologies, like anonymous com-
munication systems [11], [12].
5.4 Reduced Privacy Risks
The attributes disclosed by devices determine how much
information is revealed to a service provider. To realise data
minimisation, in some cases, no attributes should be dis-
closed at all: the simple fact that the device holds an ABC
may show that it belongs to a valid user. However, other
providers may supply di↵erent levels of a service depending
on some additional information in the form of attributes;
for example, a remote car diagnostic service may require the
model or the manufacturer of the device. If service providers
need this information to process requests, this information
leakage cannot be prevented.1
Disclosing the minimum set of attributes prevents the
linking of a device’s requests. Indeed, the multi-show un-
linkability property of ABCs ensures that the only informa-
tion that can be collected is that by the revealed attributes.
This holds even in the worst case scenario: If the issuer
1The only solution would be not to use these services at all.
and the authenticating party collude, or happen to be the
same; the service providers store information about trans-
actions centrally; and they share all this information with
each other.
6. FUTUREWORK
Future research includes various directions. First, cryp-
tographic protocols should be designed and implemented.
Based on the existing ABC protocols, these new techniques
are required to execute AB authentication within the IoT
context such as the one presented in Section 5. For instance,
the lightweight devices and simple communication channels
require to rethink several existing methods. A good addition
to these protocols is a delegation mechanism, which would
allow a user to delegate his rights to his devices. This tech-
nique then provides more flexibility to the user with regard
to distributed services and to guarding his privacy.
Second, a comprehensive summary is needed about var-
ious privacy-enhancing scenarios within the IoT. Such a
study would describe existing and potential cryptographic
primitives and protocols (e.g. PUF-based protocols). It is
foreseen that trade-o↵s should be made between the level of
achievable privacy and available performance because of lim-
ited hardware platforms (slow computation, small storage,
low bandwidth, etc.).
Third, a formal framework is needed to understand bet-
ter the exact relation between privacy and attributes in the
context of IoT.
7. CONCLUSION
The fast adoption rate of the IoT architecture has led to an
unprecedented amount of data collected about entities that
became a part of the IoT platform. This vast collection of
data has given rise to privacy issues and loss of control over
personal information collected by service providers. Since
identification often happens in networking, and also in the
foreseeable IoT infrastructure, all transactions are linkable
by default. This occurs, even though identifying information
may not be necessary for the provided service. Nevertheless,
the lack of privacy and the lack of user control have been
identified as one of the five major obstacles preventing IoT
from expanding [22].
In this paper we put forward how to integrate AB authen-
tication in the IoT architecture. Additionally, we described
a use case to explaine how AB authentication can be utilised
within an existing system to significantly reduce existing pri-
vacy risks. Finally, we adapted the term privacy to include
the notion of user control, which is most suitable for the
purpose of our work.
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